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Abstract
In the ICT sector, product-software is an important factor for the
quality of the products (e.g. cell phones). In this context, open source
software enables ﬁrms to avoid quality competition as they can co-
operate on quality without an explicit contract. The economics of
open source (OS) versus closed source (CS) business models are an-
alyzed in a general two-stage model that combines aspects of non-
cooperative R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies: In
stage one, ﬁrms develop software, either as OS or CS, or as a an OS-
CS-mix if the license allows. In stage two, ﬁrms bundle this with com-
plementary products and compete à la Cournot. The model allows for
horizontal product differentiation in stage two. The ﬁnding are: 1.)
While CS-decisions are always strategic substitutes, OS-decisions can
be strategic complements. Furthermore, CS is a strategic substitute
to OS and vice versa. 2.) The type of OS-license plays a crucial role:
only if the license prohibits a direct OS-CS code mix (like the GPL),
then Nash-equilibria with ﬁrms producing OS code exist for all pa-
rameters. 3.) In the equilibrium of a mixed industry with restricted
licenses, OS-ﬁrms offer lower quality than their CS-rivals.
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Almost all of today’s high tech products are computerized. While this
is most obviously true for applications software (e.g. games), the point
increasingly extends to hardware like cell phones and DVD players. In
these industries, a product’s quality—and hence consumer appeal—often
depends sensitively on the software it contains. Before the 1990s, compa-
nies usually developed this as ‘proprietary’ software in-house. Since then,
however, companies have increasingly turned to shared ‘open source’ code
instead. So the ICT sector is characterized by the co-existence of open
source (OS) and closed source (CS) software, the latter also called propri-
etary software. In the case of OS, the source code—i.e. the human-read-
able recipe of a software program—is ‘open’ (disclosed). This means that
everybody has access to the software and its source code and the right to
read, modify, improve, redistribute and use it. This principle of openness
is codiﬁed in the copyright based OS licenses. Thus, OS software appears
to be a case of a “private provision of a public good” (Johnson, 2002). Fur-
thermore, the OS principle—especially in the context with proﬁt-seeking
ﬁrms—seems to represent a “new intellectual property paradigm” (Maurer
and Scotchmer, 2006). So, some authors discuss the possibility to imple-
ment the ‘open source’ paradigm in further industries that are based on
digital goods, i.e. “payoff-relevant bitstring[s]” (Quah, 2003), like DNA se-
quences (open source biology/biopharmaceutical/biotechnology etc., see
Allarakhia et al., 2010; Bertacchini, 2008; Henkel and Maurer, 2007; Hope;
Maurer, 2008; Pénin and Wack, 2008; Roosendaal, 2007).
1.1. Open Source Business Models
OS software is developed by a ‘community’ that consists of thousands of vol-
unteers who develop software often without direct monetary reward. But
more and more ﬁrms engage in the OS development, hence pay programer
to develop OS code. Proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms like IBM, Motorola, Nokia, Novell,
Panasonic, Philips, Red Hat, Sony, Sun Microsystems, as well as many small
and medium sized enterprises use OS business models: As the OS-code itself
can not be a proﬁt center, OS business models are based on selling comple-
mentary products (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006, p 289, 290ff). These
1
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sions of the software, or different kinds of service like maintenance etc.1
Unlike traditional joint venture partners, OS collaborators have no formal
obligation to contribute any particular level of effort to these projects. In-
stead, companies must continuously balance the cost-savings from shared
code development against the risk that they will make their competitors’
products more desirable. This is true for all kinds of OS business models,
not only in the context of software.
1.2. Previous Economic Research
One branch focuses on the incentives of the community members. Schiff
(2002) provides an overview of early contributions regarding the question
why “should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the
provision of a public good?” (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). A prominent
explanation refers to extrinsic motivations, namely to the acquisition of
reputation-signals (Lerner and Tirole, 2000), but intrinsic motives also play
a role. An empirical study can be found e.g. in Ghosh et al. (2002), see also
the overviews in Rossi (2006) and David and Shapiro (2008). Institutional
aspects, like licenses, governance of OS projects etc., were brought into fo-
cus by e.g. Bessen (2006); Brand and Schmid (2005); von Engelhardt and
Freytag (2010); von Engelhardt (2008b); Gehring (2006); Weber (2004).
1 Linux is used for several devices as embedded software, e.g. Amazon’s Kindle, Cisco’s MDS
and Nexus data switches, Linksys’ WRT54G W-LAN router, numerous Motorola, Nokia,
and Panasonic mobile phones, Philips’ LPC3180 microcontroller, TomTom’s GPS navi-
gation systems, various LG Panasonic, Samsung, and Sony LCD and plasma televisions.
The most recent example of embedded OS is Android, a software stack (operating sys-
tem, middleware and key applications) for mobile devices. Acer, Barnes & Noble, Dell,
HTC Corporation/Google, Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson all man-
ufacture and sell products that come preinstalled with Android. Red Hat, Novell’s SUSE
and other Linux-distributors collect and optimize given OS software (ready-to-install
‘distributions’), bundle this with further CS (for “Enterprise class” premium versions)
and offer further services like support and maintenance. Most Web servers are driven
by an OS “Lamp Stack” software suite that includes a Linux operating system, Apache
Web server, MySQL database, and PHP/Perl/Python programming languages. Devel-
opment is supported by corporations like Novell, IBM, Oracle, and Borland who then
bundle LAMP with their proprietary hardware and software. Small web developers also
use LAMP in their businesses and contribute code back to the project.
2
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(von Hippel, 2005; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). The existence of
non-commercial OS software has an impact on competition and adoption
processes in software markets, analyzed e.g. by Casadesus-Masanell and
Ghemawat (2006); Economides and Katsamakas (2006); Bitzer (2004) or
Berends and van Wegberg (2000).
The increasing number of ﬁrms involved in OS inspired a recent branch
of research focusing on the role and incentives of proﬁt-oriented ﬁrms doing
OS. Contrary to the rich empirical research (among many others Dahlander
and Wallin, 2006; Fosfuri et al., 2008, 2005; Harison and Cowan, 2004;
Harison and Koski, 2010; Lerner et al., 2006; Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2006),
there is less theoretical work on OS-business models, mostly limited to
duopoly cases:
Baake and Wichmann (2004) analyze a duopoly-model where ﬁrms that
can publish parts of their software as OS. Publishing code leads to posi-
tive spillovers i.e. reduce the ﬁrms’ coding costs, but induce higher coding
expenditures and thus decreases the ﬁrms’ proﬁts if their programs are sub-
stitutes. Additionally, it encourages entry and increases the expenditures
required to deter entry. They ﬁnd that both ﬁrms invest in OS to increase
the quality and proﬁtability of their respective CS products. Where the CS
companies compete, however, each company must also increase the quality
of its CS product to retain its customers. This effect is even stronger when
the CS products compete with OS code and/or companies deliberately keep
CS quality (and development costs) high to deter entry. Though intriguing,
these results are limited to the duopoly case. Baake and Wichmann also
make the very special assumption that OS costs rise faster than CS costs.
Verani (2006) presents a Bertrand-duopoly model in which companies in-
vest in either OS or CS software and then build products that use it. She
ﬁnds that ﬁrms invest more when their products are substitutes, and that
this effort is greater when OS software is used. Schmidtke (2006) analyzes
OS business models in a non-differentiated Cournot oligopoly. Firms pro-
duce a homogeneous private good (e.g. a computer server) and invest in
the quality of a homogeneous public good (OS software). He ﬁnds that
the increasing number of ﬁrms in the market increases welfare, while the
effects on each ﬁrm’s private production and OS development, prices, and
proﬁts depend on the slope of the marginal costs of software development.
3
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plore the case of embedded Linux. Crucially, Henkel assumes that all tech-
nologies are developed in-house without shared production of any kind;
ﬁrms can, however, share costs by disclosing completed technologies to
one another. Given this set-up, Henkel ﬁnds that each OS ﬁrm concen-
trates on developing whichever technology is most valuable to its business
and copies the other technology from its rival. This creates a dynamic in
which each company specializes in and controls the technology it values
most so that total industry technology spending is biased upward. Henkel
ﬁnds that OS industries deliver more technology and higher proﬁts pro-
vided that ﬁrms do not compete too strongly with one another. However,
these advantages disappear where both ﬁrms’ products receive the same
quality-increment from each technology. In this case, OS ﬁrms are reluc-
tant to make their competitors stronger and therefore invest less than CS
ﬁrms. Furthermore, ﬁrms are most likely to choose OS business models
when competition is low, and each ﬁrm’s technology needs are different.
Finally, two recent papers provide models in the tradition of Hotelling’s
model: In both models, there is a continuum of consumers, who differ in
their valuations of the available products (heterogeneity in tastes). Fur-
thermore, each consumer buys only one package (bundle), or nothing. In
Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes (2009) consumers consume software and a
complementary service. The software is further segmented into (a) a core
program which consumers can use as a free-standing unit, and (b) exten-
sions which are valueless without the core unit. They then examine when
ﬁrms decide whether one or both software components should be devel-
oped as OS or CS, given thre cases: monopoly, a ﬁrm vs. non-proﬁt OS
project, and duopoly. They ﬁnd, inter alia, that ﬁrms are more willing to
open modules when (a) consumer demand for the complementary good is
strong, and (b) the quality of OS software is boosted by exogenous user
innovation at no cost. Llanes and de Elejalde (2009) consider a model in
which each ﬁrm sells packages consisting of a primary good (which can be
OS or CS) and a complementary private good. Consumers have idiosyn-
cratic preferences so that they usually favor one ﬁrm’s private good over
others. However, rival ﬁrms can overcome this preference by investing in
a technology that simultaneously increases the quality of both the primary
good and also the complement. Speciﬁcally, Llanes and DeElejalde analyze
4
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whether to produce OS or CS in the primary good, and then (b) simultane-
ously decide the quality/price of the bundle they will offer to consumers.
They ﬁnd that when most of the bundle’s value comes from the primary
good OS ﬁrms ﬁnd it hard to appropriate proﬁts from their investment in
an open complement. This leads to outcomes in which a small number of
ﬁrms choose CS and capture most of the market by delivering high qual-
ity code; the other ﬁrms become OS and deliver comparatively low quality
code at a low price. However, this situation changes where consumers
value the complement roughly as much as the primary. In this case, the
cost advantage of code-sharing dominates so that all ﬁrms choose to be-
come OS even though a hypothetical CS ﬁrm would produce higher quality
software. This (theoretical) CS quality advantage reﬂects OS ﬁrms’ limited
ability to recover quality gains from consumers. The advantage disappears
in cases where most of the bundle’s value comes from the complementary.
So, regarding the role of proﬁt-oriented players, there is still some lack of
a general but simple theoretical analysis of the necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for OS-production by proﬁt seeking ﬁrms, and for the coexistence
of ﬁrms with CS- versus OS-based business models (mixed industry).
1.3. The Paper at Hand
The paper aims to ﬁll this gap. We will analyze in a general way the eco-
nomics of OS vs. CS business models in terms of strategical aspects, in-
cluding the role of the OS-license type and of the non-commercial commu-
nity (the hobbyists), and the resulting industry equilibrium. The model is
based on simple linear demand, and as a general oligopoly model it covers
a wide scope of possible situations, ranging e.g. from duopoly with com-
pletely separated markets to perfect competition (inﬁnity number of ﬁrms,
perfect substitutes). Although the model is inspired by, and refers to, the
case of software, its application is not limited. It analyzes the ‘economics
of commercial open source’ in a general way, and can thus be applied to
other examples like ‘open source biology’ etc.
As already mentioned, OS business models combine commonly devel-
oped code with individually produced and sold complements. The under-
lying strategic logic is of a R&D cooperation without an explicit contract.
5
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develop an oligopoly model, where ﬁrms can do OS, or CS, or both. So, the
model is in tradition of (non-)cooperative R&D models, most prominently
represented by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Whereas the litera-
ture on (non)-cooperative R&D (e.g. see de Bondt (1997) for an overview)
analyzes R&D with given spillovers, an OS vs. CS decision of the ﬁrm deter-
mines whether ‘spillovers’ exists or not. Note that regardless whether CS
or OS (or a mix) is chosen, it is always a case of non-cooperative action.
Firms doing such contract-free OS collaborations can act in different
types of markets. For example, Linux is a platform upon which ﬁrms in
several markets build their business models. Therefore we allow for hor-
izontal product differentiation and the model is based on the theory of
differentiated oligopoly/duopoly like proposed by Dixit (1979) and further
developed e.g. by Singh and Vives (1984) or Häckner (2000).
We will also analyze the impact of an important institution on the out-
come of the game: the type of OS license. Different OS projects use differ-
ent types of licenses. These types differ with respect to whether the use of
the code is restricted or how the use is restricted respectively. For example,
so-called public licenses, like the BSD2 license, do not restrict the use of
the software and the source code in any way and thus allows OS-CS mixed
code. We will call such licenses liberal licenses. Other licenses are more
restrictive. One famous example is the GPL3. This license claims, that any
further developed software as well any derived work must be licensed as
a whole under the same license. This clause wants to make sure, that OS
code stays “open”, and is also known as the “copyleft” principle. We will
call such licenses restricted licenses as they prohibit OS-CS mixed code.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic model setup. As the model is a two-stage game it will be solved
by backward induction, i.e. section 3 provides the solution of stage two,
while section 4 analyzes the OS and CS decision of ﬁrms (stage one) given
liberal and restricted OS licenses. Section 5 deals with the equilibrium ratio
of CS- and OS-ﬁrms, assumed free entry and exit (mixed industry). Section
6 provides a summary of the ﬁndings and an outlook.
2BSD stands for Berkeley Software Distribution
3The GPL (GNU General Public License) is the most popular OS license.
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Business Models: The Basic Model Setup
In many markets, software is sold bundled with complementary products
like service (maintenance, individualizing) or hardware. Here ﬁrms make
money with business models that are based on either CS or OS software,
or software consisting of mixed CS-OS code. The basic principle of open
source business models is therefore to develop OS code together with oth-
ers, and then make money with selling the (bundled) complements. This
is the combination of a public good with a private good, or: a combination
of non-cooperative R&D (OS-ﬁrms do not have an explicit contract with
each other) with oligopolistic competition where products can be vertically
(quality) and horizontally differentiated.
Therefore, let us consider a market with n ≥ 2 ﬁrms. One arbitrary ﬁrm
is denoted by i, with i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n}. Each ﬁrm i ∈ N produces quan-
tities of a horizontal differentiated product, and develop complementary
software which can be either OS or CS code, or, if the license allows mix-
ing, an OS-CS code respectively. The software and the product are then
sold as bundle qi. Firm i’s software has a direct impact on the quality of
the bundle qi, i.e. differences in software lead to vertical product differen-
tiation. We thus need a utility function that enables us to take into account
horizontal and vertical product differentiation. There are two approaches:
One version was proposed by Sutton (1997, p 618) and used e.g. by Syme-





















The second version was introduced by Dixit (1979) for the duopoly case.
Häckner (2000) and Hsu and Wang (2005) provide a generalized version
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The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] is an inverse measure of the horizontal product
differentiation: γ indicates the (horizontal) substitutability between the
different products, with γ = 1 for perfect substitutes. The parameter αi,
vi respectively, represent the quality level of the bundle, such that vertical
product differentiation is expressed by different αs, different vs respectively.
Please notice that in our model setup both types of utility function lead to
similar results (see p 9 footnote 6). We will use the second one, i.e. function
(2).
In the following, we consider a two-stage game, that combines com-
petition in quantities with quality-competition/cooperation: Firms decide
about quantity and quality (via software). As we will show below, the de-
cision to develop OS rather than CS code is a decision to cooperate rather
than compete on quality.
1. In stage one, ﬁrms decide about their ‘stage one’-software develop-
ment. Hence, they choose their optimal amount of OS or CS. As this
affects quality, stage one represents the quality decision. As already
mentioned, we distinguish between different types of OSS licenses.
We thus analyze stage one with liberal and with restricted licenses.
2. In stage two oligopolistic competition takes place. The ﬁrms pro-
duce their ‘stage two’-products,4 bundle this with the complementary
‘stage one’-software, and compete à la Cournot. This means, in stage
two proﬁt-maximizing quantities are deﬁned.
The game will be solved by backward induction. Hence, in the next
section we start with stage two. In section 4 we then analyze stage one.
4 Please note that the ‘stage two’-product can be (closed source) software. The bundle
then consists of ‘stage one’-software plus ‘stage two’-software, i.e. is a kind of ‘Premium
Version’ of the ‘stage one’-software. However, we will refer to the software developed in
stage one as ‘stage one’-software, or ‘software’. And we will call the product produced
in stage two as ‘stage two’-product or ‘product’, whether it is software or not.
8
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0343. Stage Two: Quantity Decisions
In the stage two, the oligopolistic quantity competition with the horizon-
tally and vertically differentiated product-bundles takes place. Without loss
of generality, we normalize the marginal costs of the ‘stage two’-product to
zero. Fixed costs of ‘stage two’-products are given by C.5 Hence ﬁrms
maxqi πi = piqi − ci − C, where pi = αi − qi − γ
 
j =i qj is the inverse de-
mand function derived from the utility function (2), and ci are the software
development costs determined in stage one.
The resulting equilibrium prices and quantities of this differentiated oli-
gopoly are given by:



















The resulting revenue function, simply the square of the above expres-
sion, has strong similarities to the revenue function one would achieve
using the utility function V (function (1), p 7).6
We have introduced θ and h because this is convenient for interpreting
the results later on. As already mentioned the model combines quantity
competition (Cournot) with quality competition/cooperation. The measure
h = 2+γ(n−1) indicates the degree of quantity competition, and depends
on the number of competitors weighted by the degree of substitution. (It is
simply the denominator one can ﬁnd in any differentiated Cournot model.)
Second, θ = γ/(2−γ) indicates how much differences in quality affect ﬁrm’s
5If the ‘stage two’-product is also software, C represents the software development costs,
i.e. the so-called ﬁrst copy costs of this ‘stage-two’-software. See also footnote 4, p 8
6 On p 633 Deroian and Gannon (2006) provide a revenue function based on the utility









Notice, that we stick to their notation. In order to to obtain our notation, we have to
replace σ by 2γ and replace ui by αi. We ﬁnally obtain an equation that differs from
the revenue function of our model only by the term ½S. Deroian & Gannon denote
with S the number of consumers. Thus S represents the size of the market, and the
difference is in the level of the returns only. (If we normalize S = 2, the two revenue
functions become equal.) The similarities between outcomes of models based on the
two different types of utility functions are also mentioned by other authors, see for
example Symeonidis (2003, p 42, Appendix A).
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measures the incentive to compete rather than to cooperate on quality. In
other words: h and θ enables to separates the effects of a change of γ. If
dγ > 0 then this (a) has a negative impact on revenues, as a ﬁrm’s revenue
c. p. decrease with an increase in h, (b) has a positive impact on a ﬁrm’s
revenue given this ﬁrm has an advantage in quality.
4. Stage One: Quality Decisions
Firm i’s ‘stage one’-software has a direct impact on the quality of the bundle,
i.e. on αi. Let αi = β + xi, with xi as the software ﬁrm i can use for its
bundle. The parameter β > 0 catches the demand-relevant effects of the
quality of the ‘stage two’-product. For the sake of simplicity, the impact of
‘stage one’-software (xi) on αi is modeled linearly with an upper boundary
αi ∈ [0, ¯ α] that yields a cutoff
_
x, see ﬁgure 1. This is done in order to
avoid that—just as an artefact of the model setup—software development
can shift αi, and hence demand, towards inﬁnity.7





7The used quality function can be interpreted as being an approximation of a logistic
function. As we assume, that ﬁrms never develop more that
_
x, the quality function can
also be interpreted as being an approximation of an inverse U-shaped function.
10
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increasing marginal costs, as the costs of software development are driven
by the rising complexity of the code. Software is in some sense a ‘logi-
cal machine’, and the more sophisticated a software program becomes, the
more complex the whole system gets. Modern software development is
far more than just writing lines of code, and also consists of ﬁnding and
ﬁxing mistakes (so-called bugs). Hence the costs of software development
consists of code-writing costs but also of bug-avoiding costs (ex-post de-
signing, coordination and control), bug-ﬁnding and bug-ﬁxing costs. As
complexity of modern software rises non-linear, this yields rising marginal
costs of software development (see also von Engelhardt, 2008a, p 14 ff).
This fact is approximated by a quadratic cost function. Let φ > 0 de-
note the slope of the marginal costs. Given x is a software,8, then the
total costs are given by c(x) =
1
2   φ   x2. The total costs are independent
of whether the code is OS or CS. OS has thus no inherent cost advantage
over CS except to the extent that it allows collaborating members to share
cost. If a ﬁrm develops CS code then it bears the total costs of this xcs
i ,





2. But if a ﬁrm devel-
ops OS code then there is the cost-sharing effect, as the code is developed
collaboratively with other OS-developing ﬁrms or members of the commu-
nity. Thus depending on its own contribution (xos
i ), the ﬁrm bears only
a fraction k of the total OS-costs. Let Xos denote the total OS code. As
the ﬁrm bears only that fraction that is caused by its own development
xos
i , i.e. k = xos
i /Xos, this yields ci(xos




(1−k) c(Xos) is born by the remaining OS-developing ﬁrms and members
of the community. Of course, the latter holds independently whether the
ﬁrm develops only OS or mix OS and CS code. Taking the above aspects



















−i = Xos − xos
i .
In summary it can be said, that software development has beneﬁts (posi-
tive impact on αi, and hence on revenues) as well as its development costs.
Clearly, if a ﬁrm develops OS rather CS code, then this affects also the
costs- and beneﬁts-aspect. The OS principle is a collaborative way of devel-
8Note that this notation subsumes qualitative and quantitative aspects of the software,
hence a higher value of x can indicate more functions as well as ‘better’ functions
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 034oping and using coded, digital goods. While the principle of closed source
is based on private costs and beneﬁts, the open source principle implies a
cost and beneﬁt sharing:
• Costs: OS code is jointly developed code. This implies cost sharing,
including the complexity costs. (This implies that marginal costs of
OS development of a ﬁrm are smaller than the marginal costs of CS.)
• Beneﬁts: OS code is jointly used code. This implies beneﬁt sharing,
as all ﬁrms who use the OS code beneﬁt from its impact on quality.
Developing OS code is to cooperate rather than to compete on quality.
For CS code the opposite holds.
These two aspects determine whether OS or CS is more attractive, and is
strongly inﬂuenced by an important institution: the type of OS-license. It
will turn out, that this institutional difference matters, especially in cases
where ﬁrms are the only potential OS contributors, hence where no (non-
commercial) OS-community exists.
4.1. Liberal vs. Restricted OS-Licenses
We distinguish two types of OS-licenses: unrestricted—or: liberal—ones,
and restricted ones. While a liberal license permits to mix OS with CS code,
a restricted license prohibits any mixing of OS and CS code at the level of
‘stage one’-software:9
• In case of liberal licenses ﬁrms can mix OS and CS code. Therefore αi
is given by

























9 The prohibition to mix affects stage one! Bundling OS software with ‘stage two’-CS
software is possible.
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This separates ﬁrms into OS-ﬁrms and CS-ﬁrms. We will denote the
number of OS-ﬁrms by z and the number of CS-ﬁrms by r, such that
r +z = n (The sets of ﬁrms are denoted by capital letters: Z ∪R = N




i if i ∈ R (CSS-ﬁrm)
β + xos
i + Xos
−i if i ∈ Z (OSS-ﬁrm),
(6)















if i ∈ Z (OSS-ﬁrm).
(7)




In case of liberal licenses ﬁrms decide about their optimal OS and CS code.








































Because of the liberal license ﬁrm i’s OS and CS are substitutes: ∂ Rcs
i /∂ xos
i <
0 and ∂ Ros
i /∂ xcs
i < 0, with |∂Rcs
i /∂ xos
i | ≥ |∂Ros
i /∂ xcs
i |.
In the case of restricted license we obtain the following reaction functions
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the SOC φ > φcs
soc is deﬁned by φcs
soc = 2(1+(n−1)θ)
2/h2 in case of liberal as
well as restricted licenses. The SOC of OS, φ > φos
soc, is deﬁned by φos
soc =
2/h2 for liberal licenses, and by φos
soc = 2(1+rθ)
2/h2 for restricted licenses.
Furthermore, φcs
soc > φos
soc. As usual, in the following it is assumed that
each second order condition is fulﬁlled. (If not, “more code’ is always
better. This would yield that ﬁrms develop the cutoff
_
x)
4.2. The Strategic Nature of CS-Decisions and OS-Decisions
Because of the respective nature of OS and CS, both types of software de-
velopment differ in terms of strategic complements or substitutes. The
terms of strategic complements or substitutes were originally introduced
by Bulow et al. (1985). Decisions of players are strategic substitutes if they
mutually cut back one another. Decisions are strategic complements if the
reverse is true. We will express this with the elasticities.
CS-decisions are strategic substitutes as optimal CS development always
decreases when CS code of the other ﬁrms increases: Ecs





0. But optimal OS reacts on other players’ OS either in a positive or a
negative way. If the slope of the marginal costs φ does not exceed a cer-
tain threshold, the decisions about OS are decisions in strategic substitutes,
i.e. Eos
os = ∂ xos
i /∂ xos
j   xos
j /xos
i > 0. Of course this also holds for OS-code con-
tributed by the non-commercially oriented members of the OS-community.
We will call this community-code and denote it with xos
nc, with “nc” for “non-
commercial”. Of course, Eos
nc = ∂ xos/∂ xos
nc  xos
nc/xos can also be greater than one.
Finally, the positive feedbacks between the OS-players can be very strong:
If ∂ Ros
i /∂ xos
j > 1 then this implies a symmetric Nash-equilibrium where the
OS-developing ﬁrms together develop the cutoff. In particular:
Proposition 4.1. CS-decisions are strategic substitutes: Ecs
cs < 0.
Proof. Given the second order condition is fulﬁlled, then it is true that
∂ Rcs
i /∂ xcs
j < 0, which also implies Ecs
cs < 0.
Proposition 4.2. OS-decisions are strategic substitutes (Eos
os < 0, Eos
nc < 0) if
and only if φ > 2 φos
soc, otherwisestrategic complements (Eos
os > 0, Eos
nc > 0).
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i /∂ xos
j < 0 and ∂Ros
i /∂ xos
nc <
0 is true only for φ > 2φos
soc, otherwise is ∂ Ros
i /∂ xos
j > 0 and ∂ Ros
i /∂ xos
nc > 0.
Thus for φ > 2 φos
soc is Eos
os < 0, Eos
nc < 0, otherwise Eos
os > 0, Eos
nc > 0.
Proposition 4.3. For φ < φos _
x there exists a symmetric Nash-equilibrium of
OS-development such that Xos =
_
x.




= 1 one obtains the boundary φos _
x , which is given (a)
by φos _
x = n/(n+1)   2φos
soc in the case of liberal licenses, and (b) by φos _
x =
z/(z+1) 2φos
soc in the case of restricted licenses. For all φ < φos _
x it holds that
∂ Ros
i /∂ xos
j > 1. Thus with respect to OS the players react positive on each
other with the factor greater than one. Put simply, the positive strategic
interplay of OS is so strong that the players keep on mutually pushing up.
This leads to the fact that the upper corner solution is always an equilibrium
i.e. the OS-ﬁrms develop together Xos =
_
x. Symmetry implies that in this
Nash-equilibrium each OS-ﬁrm develop the same fraction of
_
x. See also
ﬁgure 7 in the Appendix
Proposition 4.3 has the following intuition: If φ < φos
soc then developing
more OS code is always better independ from what the other OS-players
do. The reason is the relatively low slope of the marginal costs. For
φos
soc < φ < φos _
x developing more OS code is always better, because of
what the other OS-players do. Thus the positive feedback among the play-
ers, the strong incentives to cooperate in OS shifts the boundary of ‘more
OS code is always better’ upwards. Analyzing this boundary provides some
insight in the nature of the strategic interaction of OS code by ﬁrms. φos _
x
is equal n/(n+1)  4/h2 or z/(z+1)   4(1+rθ)2/h2, depending on the type of license.
Recall that h = 2+(n−1)γand θ = γ/(2−γ), with the latter indicating the in-
centives to compete on quality. If licenses are restricted then the OS-ﬁrms
cooperate on quality among each other, but compete on quality with the
CS-ﬁrms. Therefore an increase of γ—which implies an increase of θ—has
a positive impact on the incentives to develop more OS software, namely
via (1 + rθ)2. At the same time, dγ > 0 implies dh > 0 and thus lowers
the incentives to develop more OS simply because of the increased degree
of competition. Also the number of ﬁrms, of OS-ﬁrms respectively, has a
twofold and opposing impact on incentives to develop OS software. On the
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hand, in order to reach a certain code-output, each ﬁrm has to contribute
less if more ﬁrms collaborate. This is expressed by n/(n+1), and z/(z+1) re-
spectively.
However, in the following we will concentrate on situations where φ is
high enough to ensure that total OS code is not equal the cutoff. The reason
for this is that if Xos =
_
x further model results like the equilibrium number
of OS- and CS-ﬁrms is determined by this exogenous valua, rather than by
endogenous results.
4.3. OS and CS in Case of Liberal Licenses
In this section we analyze the case of liberal licenses. In this context, the
community-code plays the following role: As liberal license allow for mixed
OS-CS code, code from the non-commercial OS-community (xos
nc) directly
impacts on both, OS as well as CS development by ﬁrms. If there is enough
community-code, ﬁrms do not develop any further software as they get
enough code “delivered for free”. With respect to ﬁrm-developed OS there
is also a second effect of xos
nc. If the ﬁrms’ markets are sufﬁciently separated,
then ﬁrms will develop OS code anyway. But if θ is higher, then there must
be at least some xos
nc to ensure that ﬁrms produce OS software. As we will
derive below, in the case of xos
nc = 0 ﬁrms contribute OS code only if θ <
1/(n+1). The reason is that for θ < 1/(n+1) quality competition measured by
θ is low. As the substitutability (γ) is low, the ﬁrms’ markets are separated
enough so that the ﬁrms have only low incentives to compete on quality
and therefore cooperating on quality is more attractive. If θ > 1/(n+1) the
incentives to compete on quality are higher. To ensure OS contributions
by ﬁrms also on this case, this incentives have to be overcompensated by
xos
nc > 0. With volunteers who contribute OS code, ﬁrms beneﬁt more from
developing OS than without them, as now the development costs are born
jointly by the ﬁrms and the volunteers.10 However, the positive effect of xos
nc
on the incentives to develop OS code has it’s limits. If θ > 1/(n−1) then there
is no ﬁrm-developed OS code at all. This means that in the case of liberal
10In some sense the non-commercial community is like a ﬁrm who develops code but do
not compete at all with the other ﬁrms. This ‘ﬁrm’ has a γ equal zero, and thus a θ equal
zero. With this ‘ﬁrm’ the average θ decreases such that it is again below the threshold.
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where ﬁrms produce OS code, no matter whether xos
nc > 0 or not (see also
section 5.1).
In detail the following propositions hold:
Proposition 4.4. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium where the ﬁrms develop only
CS (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) exists if and only if the conditions xos
nc < β(1+(n−1)θ)/η
and xos
nc < β2θ(n−1)/η are fulﬁlled, with η =
1
2φh2 −(1+(n−1)θ).
Proof. If all ﬁrms develope only CS code, then it is xos
i = 0∀i ∈ N and thus







First, xcs∗ is greater zero only if xos
nc < β(1+(n−1)θ)/η.11 Second, to ensure
that (xos = 0, xcs > 0) is an equilibrium, the optimal amount of OS must
be zero. The zero of the symmetric solution obtained from the OS reaction
function (9) with Xcs
−i = (n− 1)  xcs∗ and xcs
i = xcs∗ delivers the boundary
xos
nc = β2θ(n−1)/η. For values below this boundary optimal OS is zero. Taking
the two conditions together we can conclude that only for xos
nc that fulﬁll
xos
nc < β(1+(n−1)θ)/η and xos
nc < β2θ(n−1)/η a Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗ >
0, xos∗ = 0 exists.
Proposition 4.5. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium where the ﬁrms develop only







, with η =
1
2φh2 −(1+(n−1)θ).
Proof. If all ﬁrms develop only OS, then it is xcs
i = 0∀i ∈ N and thus the















11Otherwise ﬁrms do not develop CS as there is no incentive to do so because enough code
is delivered by the non-commercial community.
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soc (strategic complements)then
xcs∗ > 0 ∀xos







ensure that (xos > 0, xcs = 0) is an equilibrium, it must be that the optimal
amount of CS is zero. The zero of the symmetric solution obtained from
the CS reaction function (8) with Xos
−i = (n−1)  xos∗+ xos
nc and xos
i = xos∗
delivers the boundary xos
nc = β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η. Taking the two conditions







Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0 exists.
Notice that in both cases, code-output decreases when quantity competi-
tion (h) becomes more intensive. In case of CS-only is ∂ xcs/∂ h < 0 and in
case of OS-only is ∂ xos/∂h < 0. The reason is that strong quantity competi-
tion limits the appropriability of quality investments in any case. Further-
more, while CS reacts to the degree of quality competition (∂ xcs/∂ θ > 0),
the OS of OS-only lacks of θ. The reason is that in case of OS ﬁrms coop-
erate on quality: they avoid quality competition through code-sharing. Fi-





Proposition 4.6. A symmetric Nash-equilibrium where the ﬁrms develop OS
and CS (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0) exists if and only if β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η < xos
nc <
β2θ(n−1)/η, with η =
1
2φh2 −(1+(n−1)θ).
Proof. Optimal CS and OS are given by the reaction functions (8) and (9).
We make use of the fact that, because of symmetry, in equilibrium ∀i: xos
i =
xos and xcs
i = xcs. Reciprocal substitution leads to the solution for (8) and




















From the two non-negativity constraints (xcs∗>0 and xos∗>0) we directly
derive the two conditions xos




nc exceeds this level, then there is so much community code that ﬁrms do not have
any incentives to develop any further code.
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then there is CS only.
Proof. First, for θ > 1/(n−1) it is true that β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η > β2θ(n−1)/η.
Thus an equilibrium with xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0 can not exist (see proposi-








2φh2 − (1+(n−1)θ). This yields that for θ > 1/(n−1) an equilib-
rium with xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0 can not exist (see proposition 4.5). Finally if
θ > 1/(n−1), then β(1+(n−1)θ)/η < β2θ(n−1)/η. We can now conclude that if
xos
nc < β(1+(n−1)θ)/η an equilibrium with xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0 exists, as the two
conditions of proposition 4.4 are fulﬁlled.
Proposition 4.8. If there is no code from the non-commercial community
xos
nc = 0, then ﬁrms develop OS only if θ < 1/(n+1).
Proof. With xos
nc = 0 the upper conditions of both equilibria with OS, i.e.
xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0 and xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0, are fulﬁlled. With xos
nc = 0 the
lower boundary of both types of equilibria with OS are the same (compare
4.5 with 4.6) and yield the condition β(n − 1)((n+1)θ −1) < 0. This is
fulﬁlled only if θ < 1/(n+1).
The impact of xos
nc can be summarized as follows. For CS-only and OS-
only Nash-equilibria (i.e. for xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0 and xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0)
the following holds: Except for the case that OS-decisions are strategic
complements (φ < 2φos
soc), xos
nc crowds out ﬁrm-developed code. In both
cases ﬁrms substitute own developed code with the ‘cost free’-code xos
nc.
In case of CS-OS equilibria (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0) the impact of dxos
nc > 0 is
different: There is a crowding-out as well as a crowding-in, as ∂ xcs∗/∂ xos
nc > 0
and ∂ xos∗/∂ xos
nc < 0, with ∂ xcs∗/∂ xos
nc = −∂ xos∗/∂ xos
nc. Additionally, for 1/(n+1) <
θ < 1/(n−1) an equilibrium with ﬁrm-developed OS code exists only if xos
nc >
β((n+1)θ−1)(n−1)/η. Otherwise the incentives to cooperate are too low and
there is only competition on quality, hence CS software only. If θ > 1/(n−1)
there is no ﬁrm developed OS software at all, independent of xos
nc.
4.4. OS and CS in Case of Restricted Licenses
In the case of restricted licenses we have to distinguish between CS-ﬁrms
(i ∈ R) and OS-ﬁrms (i ∈ Z). Therefore we have to analyze (a) how much
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OS-ﬁrms will coexist. The latter refers to the question of the equilibrium
proportion of OS-ﬁrms in the industry. We will examine this in section 5.2.
In the current section we derive xcs∗ and xos∗ for any given number of CS-
and OS-ﬁrms.
We establish the equilibrium values for OS and CS in two steps. First we
solve for optimal decision regarding the interaction among the CS-ﬁrms,
and among the OS-ﬁrms:







for all Xos < β/zθ, otherwise xcs = 0.



























nc/(1+rθ)θ, otherwise xos = 0.13




Furthermore, for convenience we replace the denominator of xcs and xcs

























As before, we will discuss the impact of quantity competition and quality
competition on the OS and CS output. Assumed there are no CS ﬁrms
13As mentioned above we focus on cases where φ > φ
os _
x . In the case of φ < φ
os _
x multible
equilibria exist, see the Appendix.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 034(r = 0 and thus n = z), then OS is again only affected by h, the degree
of quantity competition, with ∂ xos/∂ h < 0. Only if the OS-ﬁrms face CS-
competitors, they have to compete on quality (against the CS-ﬁrms). In
case of CS, ﬁrms compete on quality regardless whether there are OS-ﬁrms
or not. Hence, if z = 0 we have ∂ xcs/∂θ > 0 and ∂ xcs/∂ h < 0.
The next step takes into account the interaction between the CS- and
OS-ﬁrms. It turns out that CS is a strategic substitute to OS and vice versa.




Proof. It is Ecs
os = ∂ xcs/∂ xos   xcs/xos < 0 and Ecs
nc = ∂ xcs/∂ xos
nc   xos
nc/xcs < 0.
Proposition 4.10. For OS development, CS code is a strategic substitute:
Eos
cs < 0.
Proof. It is Eos
cs = ∂ xos/∂ xcs   xcs/xos < 0 for all χ > 0. (For χ < 0, i.e. the case
where OS ﬁrms produce the cutoff, see the Appendix.)
Now, (12) and (13) yield the Nash-equilibria in the simultaneous deci-
sion about OS and CS for a given number of OS- and CS-ﬁrms. There exist
equilibria where only one type of ﬁrm develops software as well as where
both types develop code. In particular:
Proposition 4.11. A Nash-equilibrium where only the CS-ﬁrms develop soft-
ware (xcs∗> 0, xos∗= 0) exists in the case that the




cs ), if and only if xos
nc < β/zθ and also xos
nc <
β (1+ rθ)κ/µ,
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nc < β/zθ. Second,






nc/(1+rθ)θ. Inserting the above expression of xcs∗ and solving
for xos
nc leads to xos
nc < βκ/µ if µ > 0, and xos

















The interpretation of proposition 4.11 is as follows. First, there must
be CS-development. Recall that Ecs
nc < 0, i.e. OS software from the non-
commercial community has a negativ impact on CS output. Thus, it must
be that xos
nc < β/zθ, otherwise xos
nc suppresses code-development by CS-
ﬁrms, regardless of additional OS code by ﬁrms. Second, the developed
CS code must be enough to suppress OS-development by ﬁrms. Suppose
that xos
nc = 0. In such a case xcs∗ supresses ﬁrm-OSS if rxcs∗ > β/θ. This
condition is fulﬁlled if the marginal costs of software-development rise rel-
atively slowly, namely if φ < φcs
soc (1+ nθ)/(1+(n−1)θ). If the marginal costs
rise faster, then the cost-sharing aspect of OS becomes so dominant that the
OS-ﬁrms always develop some code. In case of xos
nc > 0 one has to take into
account that xos
nc has an direct and an indirect impact on xos. The indirect ef-
fect is that xos
nc affects xcs and xcs in turn affects xos. Via this indirect effect
xos
nc has a positive impact on xos, because xos
nc decreases xcs (Ecs
nc < 0), and
this decrease has a positive impact on xos (Eos
cs < 0). The direct effect of xos
nc
on xos is expressed by Eos
nc and can be positve or negative. If OS-decisions
are only weak strategic substitutes or even strategic complements, then the
overall effect is positive. Thus, to ensure that xos = 0 there must be not
too much xos
nc. But if xos





nc helps to suppress ﬁrm-OS. (If OS-decisions are very strong strate-
gic substitutes, then ﬁrm-OS is suppressed even for xos
nc = 0. Formally:
β(1+rθ)κ/µ < 0).
Proposition 4.12. A Nash-equilibrium where only the OS-ﬁrms develop soft-
ware (xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0) exists in the case that
• OS-decisions are strategic substitutes (Eos











• OS-decisions are strategic complements (Eos
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if OS-decisions are strategic substitutes.14 If they are strategic comple-
ments, then xos∗ > 0 ∀xos
nc. Second, the corresponding xcs∗ must be zero.
We obtain from (12) the condition zxos∗+xos





Proposition 4.12 is straightforward. If OS-decisions are strategic comple-
ments, then any xos
nc fosters OS-development by ﬁrms. If they are strategic
substitutes, xos
nc crowds out ﬁrm-OS. To ensure that the CS-ﬁrms do not de-
velop any code, total OS (Xos) must be greater than β/zθ. As a consequence
there is the need for sufﬁcient community-code, if the joint code output
of the OS-ﬁrms is not enough. There is no need for community-code to
fulﬁll the condition if the marginal costs of software-development rise rela-
tively slowly: for φ < (1+nθ)/(1+rθ)   z/(z+1)  2 φos
soc OS-ﬁrms jointly produce
enough code to suppress CS. In this case is (χ−z2θ(1+rθ))β/
1
4h2φθ < 0 and
the condition is therefore fulﬁlled ∀xos
nc.
Proposition 4.13. A Nash-equilibrium where both types of ﬁrm develop soft-
ware (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0) exists
(a) for Eos
cs Ecs
os < 1 in the case that












if and only if xos
nc < βσ/
1




os > 1 in the case that




cs ), if and only if βσ/
1
4h2φθ < xos
nc < β(1+rθ)κ/µ ,
14If x
os
nc exceeds this level, then there is so much community-code that the OS-ﬁrms do not
have any incentives to develop own code.
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if and only if xos
nc > βσ/
1
4h2φθ and also xos
nc > β(1+rθ)κ/µ,
with σ = χ −z2θ (1+ rθ), and κ =
1

























os > 1: If the denominator is positive, then xcs and xos are




4h2φθ. The condition for xos∗ > 0 depends on whether
µ > 0 or not. This is greater zero if Eos
nc < −Ecs
ncEos
cs which then implies
that xos
nc < β(1+rθ)κ/µ is the condition for xos∗ > 0. Otherwise the opposite
holds. Case Eos
cs Ecs
os < 1: If the denominator is negative, then xcs and xos
are postive if also the numerators have a negative sign. Thus the unequal
signs of the conditions are reversed.
The logic behind proposition 4.13 is the following. OS and CS are lin-
ear functions of each other, and OS and CS react on each other as strate-
gic substitutes (see propositions 4.9 and 4.10). A Nash-equilibrium with
(xcs∗> 0, xos∗> 0) can thus exist only if either (a) neither (xcs∗> 0, xos∗=
0) nor (xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0) exist, or (b) both (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) and
(xcs∗ = 0, xos∗ > 0) exist. Figure 2 illustrates the underlying logic with
an symmetric example of decisions in strategic substitutes. In the left
hand side of ﬁgure 2 there is only one equilibrium: the inner solution
y∗
1 > 0, y∗
2 > 0. In the right hand side there are three equilibria. The inner
solution (y∗
1 > 0, y∗
2 > 0) as well as the two corner solutions y∗
1 > 0, y∗
2 = 0
and y∗
1 = 0, y∗
2 > 0. Applying this to our model implies that a Nash-
equilibrium where both types of ﬁrms develop code exists if (a) neither
15Notice that we have deﬁned the elasticities with respect to (12) and (13). Thus the sym-
metry of OS-ﬁrms, and of CS-ﬁrms, each was taken into account. Namely the derivatives
are ∂ xcs/∂ xos = −(1+(n−1)θ)z2θ/ψ and ∂ xos/∂ xcs = −(1+rθ)rθ/ψ.
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proposition 4.11 nor 4.12 are fulﬁlled, or (b) proposition 4.11 and 4.12
are fulﬁlled simultaneously. From this, including the non negativity condi-
tions, one obtains the conditions of the above proposition.
This section has analyzed the equilibria in code production for restricted
licenses. It turns out that such licenses stabilize ﬁrm contributions to OS:
If there are only OS-ﬁrms (r = 0), then ﬁrms develop OS code unless there
is enough community code. Thus if xos
nc = 0, hence if no non-commercial
community exists, the OS-ﬁrms always produce OS, see (13). Also if OS-
ﬁrms compete with CS-ﬁrms there can be ﬁrm-OS if xos
nc = 0. However, the
impact of community-code on the different equilibria is more complex as
with liberal licenses. The reason for this is that xos
nc directly affects optimal
OS, via this indirectly CS, on which in turn OS again reacts.
5. Mixed Industries
This section analyzes mixed industries. Throughout the paper a mixed in-
dustry is deﬁned as an industry with n ﬁrms and OS as well as CS produc-
tion by ﬁrms in equilibrium. Of course, we have to distinguish whether the
OS license is liberal or restricted:
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If licenses are liberal, then all ﬁrms can develop OS as well as CS code. Re-
call, that here the degree of quality competition (θ) has a strongly negative
impact on ﬁrm-OS. For all θ > 1/(n−1) ﬁrms develop only CS code (proposi-
tion 4.7). Furthermore, if there is no community-code (xos
nc = 0) ﬁrms also
develop no OS code unless θ < 1/(n+1).(proposition 4.8). This implies that
for 1/(n+1) < θ < 1/(n−1) a mixed industry exists only if xos
nc has the proper
value, while only for θ < 1/(n+1) a mixed industry exists also in the absence
of a non-commercial oriented community.
As θ = γ/(2−γ), the above conditions are equivalent to γ < 2/(n+2) and
γ < 2/n. Figure 3 gives a graphical impression of the two conditions. Un-
less industries are very concentrated (small n), markets are must be very
















No OS by Firms
Must be enough community-code
to ensure that ﬁrms also develop OS.
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the thresholds for the (horizontal) degree of substitution are γ = 0.1 ¯ 66 and
γ = 0.2, while for a n = 100 industry the thresholds are γ = 0.0196 and
γ = 0.02. Finally, limn→∞ 2/(n+2) = 0 and limn→∞ 2/(n) = 0.
5.2. Restricted Licenses: Equilibrium of OS- and CS-Firms
This subsection analyzes the ratio of OS- and CS-ﬁrms, assumed free entry
and exit. We will not be explicit about the entry process as such and thus
also ignore possible historical events (lock-ins) in this paper.16 We analyze
the condition for a stable mixed industry, i.e. a situation that resists further
entry by OS- and CS-ﬁrms. An n-ﬁrm industry with z OS-ﬁrms and r CS-
ﬁrms is an equilibrium if the incumbents earn proﬁts πi ≥ 0 and an ad-
ditional OS- or CS-entrant would earn negative proﬁts. This condition is
fulﬁlled if πi = 0∀i ∈ N. This is a sufﬁcient condition, and it is also the
necessary condition if n is large.17 Therefore, this paper concentrates on
the zero-proﬁt condition18
πi∈Z = pi∈Z  qi∈Z − ci∈Z − C = πi∈R = pi∈R  qi∈R − ci∈R − C = 0. (16)
Furthermore, we concentrate on Nash-equilibria where both types of ﬁrm
develop code: (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ > 0). The reason is the following: If there
is no community-code (xos
nc = 0), then (xcs∗ > 0, xos∗ = 0) and (xcs∗ = 0,
xos∗ > 0) violate the zero-proﬁt condition. The following lemmas 5.1 and
5.2 show this, with β normalized to β = 1 without loss of generality.
Lemma 5.1. Given a Nash-equilibrium where only the CS-ﬁrms develop soft-
ware (xcs∗> 0, xos∗= 0), the CS-ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts than the OS-ﬁrms
for β = 1 and xos
nc = 0.
16The question of possible lock-ins, strategic OS-versus-CS decision of incumbents etc. is
analyzed in MAURER.
17 For small n the sufﬁcient and necessary condition is: πi ≥ 0∀i ∈ N, πe < 0 with e / ∈ N
is either a CS- or an OS-entrant. For n  → ∞ the sufﬁcient and necessary conditions
converge to πi = 0.
18A discussion of πi > 0∀i ∈ N, πe < 0 with e / ∈ N is either a CS- or an OS-entrant can be
found in MAURER.
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nc = 0 proﬁts for xcs > 0, xos = 0
are πi∈Z = (1−rθ xcs)
2/h2 and πi∈R = (1+xcs(1+zθ))
2/h2 − xcs2φ/2. Now let us
assume that πi∈Z > πi∈R. There are two necessary conditions for this:
(a) OSS-ﬁrms achieve positive prices. This is true if and only if xcs < 1/rθ.
(b) πi∈Z > πi∈R implies that xcs > 4(1+nθ)/[φh2+2(r2θ2−(1+zθ)
2)].
The conditions (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulﬁlled if and only if φ >
2(1+nθ)2/h2. With β = 1 and xos
nc = 0 proposition 4.11 leads to the condition
φ < 2(1+nθ)(1+(n−1)θ)/h2. But 2(1+nθ)2/h2 > 2(1+nθ)(1+(n−1)θ)/h2. We can now
conclude that (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulﬁlled, i.e. that πi∈Z > πi∈R,
if and only if a Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗> 0, xos∗= 0 does not exist.
Lemma 5.2. Given a Nash-equilibrium where only the OS-ﬁrms develop soft-
ware (xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0), the OS-ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts than the CS-ﬁrms
for β = 1 and xos
nc = 0.
Proof by contradiction. With β = 1 and xos
nc = 0 proﬁts for xcs = 0, xos > 0
are πi∈Z = (1+(1+rθ)zxos)
2/h2 − 1/2φzxos2 and πi∈R = (1−z2θ xos)
2
/h2. Now let
us assume that πi∈Z < πi∈R. There are two necessary conditions for this:
(a) CSS-ﬁrms achieve positive prices. This is true if and only if the condi-
tion xos < 1/(z2θ) is fulﬁlled.
(b) πi∈Z < πi∈R implies that xos > 4(1+nθ)/[φh2+2z(z2θ2−(1+rθ)
2)] holds.
The conditions (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulﬁlled if and only if φ >
2z(1+nθ)
2/h2. With β = 1 and xos
nc = 0 proposition 4.12 yields the condition
φ < 2z/1+z   2(1+nθ)(1+rθ)/h2. But 2z(1+nθ)
2/h2 > 2z/(1+z)   2(1+nθ)(1+rθ)/h2. We
can now conclude that (a) and (b) are simultaneously fulﬁlled, i.e. that
πi∈Z < πi∈R, if and only if a Nash-equilibrium with xcs∗= 0, xos∗> 0 does
not exist.
Furthermore, if there is community code, then obviously lemma 5.2 still
holds. Lemma 5.2 has to be modiﬁed only slightly: If there is a sufﬁcient
high amount of community-OS, then the OS-ﬁrms can survive in the market
without contributing. Allegorically spoken, OS-ﬁrms in such a case live in
Cockaigne (land of plenty) as they get enough code “for free”. However, as
this is a trivial case we exclude this from the following analysis.
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pi∈Z  qi∈Z − ci∈Z = pi∈R  qi∈R − ci∈R.
We use this to numerically calculate stable mixed industries. Figure 4 de-
picts the typical example of an industry with n = 100 ﬁrms. The solid line












































is the outcome for φ = 2, β = 1, and xos
nc = 0. (xos
nc was set equal zero
to ensure that for all parameters no ‘Cockaigne-situation’ for the OS-ﬁrms
exist. The impact of spooky is explained below.) As the reader can con-
ﬁrm by inspection, the proportion of CS-ﬁrms decreases when the products
produced in stage two become closer substitutes. The corresponding ﬁg-
ure 5 shows the total market share of products (bundles) with OS or CS
code. For industries with high γ, thus with only a low degree of horizontal
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product differentiation, the market share of CS-based products exceeds the
OS-based ones. For γ close to one, 80% or more of the products are based
on CS, while less than half of the ﬁrms in the market are CS-ﬁrms. In other
words: some ‘big’ CS-ﬁrms compete with ‘small’ OS-ﬁrms. Furthermore,
CS-ﬁrms offer higher quality (more code per bundle). The latter statement
still holds when the parameters φ and β are changed, while the propor-
tion of OS-ﬁrms in the industry and the market share of OS-based products
differ. Figures 4 and 5 also depict the impact of different φ and β:
The dotted line represents the case of φ = 5, i.e. when the marginal costs
of software development increase more steeply. As result, the number of
OS-ﬁrms in the industry as well as the market share of OS-based products
is higher. The reason for this is that with higher φ quality-investments
(software-development) become more costly (costs increase more steeply)
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more attractive. Therefore more OS-ﬁrms are in equilibrium in the industry,
with each ﬁrm’s market share as well as the total market share of OS-based
products being higher.
The dashed line represents a lower quality of the stage two product:
β = 0.8. Recall, that the quality of the bundles (αi = β + xi) directly
affects demand: pi = αi − qi − γ
 
j =i qj. Thus, a lower β means that
the complementary private good is of less importance for generating rev-
enues. Hence, the software-decision pays more. As one would expect, this
decreases the number of ﬁrms running OS-business models. On the other
hand, when software-development becomes more important, then the re-
maining OS-ﬁrms have a higher incentive to develop code as they compete
on quality with the CS-ﬁrms. This explains why for higher γ the market
share of OS-based products is higher compared to the β = 1 case. Here the
OS-ﬁrms together produce more code (offer higher quality) as they would
do in the β = 1 case.
Finally the impact of community-code can be analyzed with numerical
examples. The effect is straightforward: xos
nc > 0 makes OS-businessmodels
more attractive. As result, the number of OS-ﬁrms in the industry as well
as their total and individual market share increase. Furthermore, even for
small xos
nc, ﬁrms stop developing OS-code if the products becomes more
substitutes. In these cases OS-ﬁrms survive in the market without the need
to invest. In such cases OS-ﬁrms do not contribute to the OS software but
just use it.
6. Summary and Outlook
The paper analyzes the economics of open versus closed source business mod-
els with a general model. In stage one ﬁrms develop software, either as
OS or CS code, or as a mix of OS and CS code. In stage two ﬁrms bundle
this ‘stage one’-software with complementary products (hardware, service,
or proprietary software), and then compete. Competition in stage two is
modeled as oligopolistic competition. We allow for horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. Furthermore, ﬁrm i’s software developed in stage one affect
quality and hence increase consumers’ willingness to pay for qi and yields
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• The rationale of OS business models can be explained with a general
two-stage model that combines aspects of non-cooperative R&D with
the theory of differentiated oligopolies. OS enables ﬁrms to cooper-
ate on quality, hence to avoid quality competition.
• If licenses allow a direct mix of OS with CS code, then there is OS
development by ﬁrms only if the degree of quality competition is low.
Otherwise a public good dilemma occurs: ﬁrms use given OS-code
if there is one, but produce only CS code. Restricted licenses ensure
OS-development.
• A ﬁrm’s CS code is always a strategic substitute to other ﬁrms’ CS
code, whereas a ﬁrm’s OS can be a strategic complement to other
ﬁrms’ OS code.
• Assumed free entry and exist, and that the OS-license is restricted,
then equilibria of mixed industries (OS- and CS-ﬁrms) exist. Here OS-
ﬁrms offer lower quality than their CS-rivals. If the products are close
substitutes then CS-based products have the major market share.
The paper does not calculate welfare. However, the fact that in industry
equilibrium the OS-ﬁrms are the low-quality providers offers a ﬁrst hint
towards the result: Compared to social optimum, there are too many OS-
ﬁrms in the market. Furthermore, the paper is also not explicit about the
entry process and thus ignore possible historical events like lock-ins. Also
strategic OS- versus CS-decisions by incumbents are not taken into account.
Thus, it is possible that industries stick in pure rather than mixed equilibria.
These aspects are analyzed in von Engelhardt and Maurer (2010).
Finally, the paper analyzes the incentives for ﬁrms doing OS based on
simple economic incentives only. Thus, social interactions and community-
norms are not taken into account. It is well known, that the OS-community
pays attention to what e.g. ﬁrms do and at least some kind of contribution
may be expected by the community. Thus, social norms can play a role
here, as breaking the rules will be sanctioned by the community, that is
stop cooperating or migrate to other projects (Osterloh et al., 2001, p 16
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licenses than the model predicts. However, it is still true that the simple
Cournot logic has surprisingly high explanatory regarding the question why
ﬁrms contribute to OS. Also for cases where no non-commercial community
delivers some code for free, the model explains the rationale of OS-based
business models in a general framework. And ﬁnally the model points to
the importance of formal institutions, namely the type of OS license.
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If φ > φos _
x , then there is always only one unique equilibrium in OS devel-
opment, and furthermore CS output decreases xos∗. Figure A depicts this

















with an example of z = 2 OS-ﬁrms: if xcs is moderate, OS ﬁrms develop
xos > 0 (left hand), while if there is much xcs, xos production is driven to
zero (right hand).
For φ < φos _
x , the situation is more complex. In this case the slope of the
OS-reaction functions (with respect to the other ﬁrms’ OS) are greater than
one. This implies that multible equilibria can exist. Again, we illustrate this
graphically for the case of z = 2. If xcs = 0 or low enough, then the OS ﬁrms
together develop the cutoff, see the left hand of ﬁgure 7. But if xcs is high
enough, then the OS-rection functions are shifted so that multibleequilibria
exist. The right hand side of ﬁgure 7 depicts such a situation. Without
additional assumptions, each of the three equilibria are plausible. Hence,
either the OS ﬁrms develop the cutoff, or the equilibrium 0 < Xos <
_
x
establishes, or the OS ﬁrms develop no code at all.
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